Naive Textualism in Patent Law by Siegel, Jonathan R.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
Statutory Interpretation: How Much Work Does
Language Do?
Article 9
2011
Naive Textualism in Patent Law
Jonathan R. Siegel
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan R. Siegel, Naive Textualism in Patent Law, 76 Brook. L. Rev. (2011).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol76/iss3/9
1019 
Naïve Textualism in Patent Law* 
Jonathan R. Siegel† 
INTRODUCTION 
This symposium asks, “How much work does language 
do?” The answer these days is “too much.” Courts are letting 
statutory language do the work that used to be done by judges’ 
paying sensitive attention to context, history, policy, and 
background understandings.1 Or at least, they are apparently 
doing so—the even less appealing possibility is that courts are 
using statutory language as a cover for decisions reached on 
other grounds.2 
I have long argued that part of the judicial function in 
statutory interpretation is to apply “background principles” of 
law, or “field-specific canons of construction.”3 Courts, in 
construing statutes, should—and do—discern the background 
principles of the area of law of which a statute is a part and 
interpret statutory text in light of them. Background principles 
of law frequently influence statutory interpretation, and in 
appropriate cases, the force of field-specific canons of 
construction may be so great as to cause courts to depart from 
apparently clear statutory text.4 
  
 * © 2011 Jonathan R. Siegel. All rights reserved. 
 † Professor of Law, Kahan Research Professor, George Washington 
University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School. The author is 
currently on leave from teaching while serving as the Director of Research and Policy 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States. This essay is written in the 
author’s academic capacity and is not endorsed by the United States or any agency 
thereof. The author wishes to thank the participants in the Brooklyn Law School 
symposium at which this paper was presented for their helpful comments. 
 1 See infra Part II.B. 
 2 See infra Part II.C. 
 3 Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 123, 123-29; Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us 
About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309, 348 (2001); Jonathan R. 
Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 
1033, 1043-44, 1054 (1998) [hereinafter Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism]. 
 4 See, e.g., Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 3, at 1045-48. 
Such cases are unusual, but they are sufficiently numerous to demonstrate that reliance 
on background principles is a part of the judicial process of statutory construction. 
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Textualist interpreters, however, are pushing more and 
more in the direction of insistently following statutory text. 
Textualists are becoming increasingly radical, as they 
gradually realize that the accommodations they previously 
allowed in order to reach sensible results are inconsistent with 
fundamental textualist premises.5 This trend has resulted in 
the creation of a “naïve textualism.” This mode of 
interpretation is not sharply differentiated from textualism per 
se, but is distinguished by its naïve attitude that statutes can 
be best understood by simply looking up their words in a 
dictionary, applying a few canons of statutory construction, and 
eschewing other considerations. 
The Supreme Court recently provided an excellent 
example of its radical shift in the direction of naïve textualism 
in the field of patent law. For decades—indeed, for centuries—
patent law was a paradigm of richly contextualized judicial 
interpretation. Courts understood the sparse text of patent 
statutes in light of history, policy, and background 
understandings of the field of patent law.6 In the recent case of 
Bilski v. Kappos,7 however, the Supreme Court looked to little 
more than the dictionary in deciding fundamentally important 
questions under the patent statute. Bilski shows the dangers of 
language doing too much work.  
This essay first outlines the Court’s shift from a richly 
contextual approach to a naïvely textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation in patent law,8 and then discusses why 
courts should avoid naïve textualism.9 
I. INTERPRETING THE PATENT ACT, THEN AND NOW 
A. Traditional Methods of Interpreting the Patent Act 
For a statute that governs such an important and 
tremendously varied array of human behavior, the Patent Act 
is remarkably compact. Three short sections set out the 
requirements that a patentable invention be new, useful, and 
nonobvious, and comprise a patentable subject matter.10 But life 
  
 5 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 117, 120-22 (2009). 
 6 See infra Part I.A. 
 7 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 8 See infra Part I. 
 9 See infra Part II. 
 10 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2006). 
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under the patent statute is not as simple as its brief text might 
suggest: “the statute cannot be read in isolation from the array 
of judicial precedent that has interpreted nearly each of its 
words.”11 In making the terse language of the patent statute 
workable in practice, the courts have glossed, strained, and 
sometimes departed from the statutory text, and they have not 
been embarrassed to acknowledge their policy reasons for doing 
so. To fully document the judicial role in drawing patent law 
principles out of sparse statutory text would require far more 
space than is available in a symposium contribution, but a few 
examples will give the flavor of traditional judicial methods of 
interpreting the Patent Act. 
1. Novelty 
Section 102 of the Patent Act, which embodies the 
statutory requirement that a patented invention be “new,” has 
been the subject of much judicial development. For example, 
the statute provides that an invention cannot be patented if, 
prior to the applicant’s invention of it, the invention was 
“known . . . by others in this country.”12 Notwithstanding the 
seemingly straightforward text of the statute, however, the 
courts have held that the word “known” means “publicly 
known.” A patent, therefore, is not barred by prior knowledge 
of the invention that was not available to the public.13 The 
courts have justified this somewhat strained reading on the 
policy ground that an inventor should not lose patent rights 
because of knowledge that a prior inventor kept “in his closet.”14 
This textual strain becomes more readily apparent 
when one contrasts this reading of “known” with the reading 
that courts give to the rule that a patent cannot be granted if 
the claimed invention was in “public use” more than a year 
prior to the date of the patent application.15 The cases that 
address this issue hold that a use is a “public use,” within the 
meaning of the statute, even if it is hidden from public view 
and gives the public no information about the invention—as 
  
 11 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE 
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 323 (2003). 
 12 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 13 E.g., Carella v. Starlight Archery, 804 F.2d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re 
Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 854 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (referring to this rule as a “well-established 
principle”).  
 14 Heath v. Hildreth, 11 F. Cas. 1003, 1005 (C.C.D.C. 1841). 
 15 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
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might occur, for example, if the invention were a mechanism 
hidden in the workings of a watch.16 Thus, the statutory 
prohibition that includes the word “public” requires less public 
knowledge than the statutory text that does not—certainly a 
surprising result from a textualist perspective.17 
The surprise is still greater when one learns that even 
the most open, public use of an invention does not count as a 
“public use” if the purpose of the use is to test the invention, 
even though the statutory text makes no reference to the 
purpose of a use.18 Again, the courts have not hesitated to justify 
this atextual reading on policy grounds, based on the rationale 
that “it is the interest of the public, as well as [of the inventor], 
that the invention should be perfect and properly tested.”19 Many 
similar examples of courts adopting atextual interpretations of 
the Patent Act’s novelty requirement could be cited.20 
2. Nonobviousness 
Section 103 of the Patent Act provides that, even if an 
invention survives the novelty requirement of section 102, a 
patent cannot be obtained if the invention “would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
  
 16 Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881). 
 17 See id. at 338-39 (Miller, J., dissenting) (complaining that “the word public 
is . . . an important member of the sentence” and that the Court’s reading “eliminate[s] 
from the statute the word public”). 
 18 Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) (holding 
that installing experimental pavement on a public toll road for six years was not a “public 
use”). 
 19 Id. at 137. 
 20 Indeed, the first U.S. patent act barred a patent if the invention was 
“known or used before the application” for a patent. Patent Act, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
Read naïvely, this language would bar all patents, because every inventor necessarily 
knows his or her claimed invention before applying for a patent for it. The Supreme 
Court saved the statute by interpreting it as applying only to knowledge or use by 
others besides the inventor, as Section 102(a) now provides. E.g., Shaw v. Cooper, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 319 (1833). 
  Another strikingly atextual reading relates to manufacturing process 
inventions. If a process is secretly used to produce a product that is openly sold, such 
use is a “public use” of the process only if it is by the patentee himself, and not if it is 
by others, even though the statutory text makes no reference to who is using the 
invention. Compare Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 
F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding such use to be public if by the patentee himself), with 
W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding such use 
not to be public if by another). In each case, the court justified its interpretation on 
policy grounds. See W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550 (holding that the law prefers a later 
inventor who files a patent application over an earlier one who keeps the process 
secret); Metallizing Eng’g, 153 F.2d at 520 (holding that the patent applicant should 
not be permitted to “extend . . . his monopoly”). 
2011] NAÏVE TEXTUALISM IN PATENT LAW 1023 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains.”21 This requirement was born as an extratextual 
statutory gloss; the Supreme Court read it into the word 
“invention” in the Patent Act (if, indeed, the Court was 
concerning itself with statutory language at all) long before the 
modern section 103 even existed.22 Today, the requirement is 
the subject of a strikingly atextual rule: although the text 
clearly turns on whether the invention would have been 
obvious “at the time the invention was made,” the lower courts 
have held that it bars a patent for an invention that would 
have been obvious in light of material published more than a 
year before the filing of the patent application, even if 
publication took place after the invention was made.23 Again, 
this interpretation is justified on policy grounds.24 
3. Subject Matter 
Perhaps nowhere has the judiciary played a larger role 
in the development of patent law than with regard to 
patentable subject matter—the fundamental question of what 
kinds of things are patentable. Section 101 of the Patent Act 
provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”25 Innumerable cases have attempted to explain this 
requirement, particularly with regard to “process” inventions. 
Although the statutory term “process” seems very broad 
(especially since it is further statutorily defined to mean 
“process, art, or method”),26 the courts have long imposed 
restrictions based on widely shared understandings of what 
kinds of things are patentable. Most fundamentally, the 
Supreme Court has held that “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable.27 This rule 
is tied less to statutory text than to the principle that such 
  
 21 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  
 22 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850). It is unclear 
from the Court’s opinion whether the Court was interpreting a specific word in the 
Patent Act or simply relying on general principles. 
 23 In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 987-90 (C.C.P.A. 1965).  
 24 See id. 
 25 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 26 Id. § 100(b). 
 27 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
1024 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3 
things cannot be patented because they are “the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”28 While the boundaries of the 
category of “abstract idea” are not especially clear, the 
Supreme Court has held, for example, that algorithmic 
processes that do no more than manipulate numbers are not 
patentable, even though they would fall within the dictionary 
definition of the term “process.”29 
Particular controversy has surrounded the patentability 
of processes that may be characterized as “business methods.” 
Although the dictionary definition of the term “process” (and its 
statutory predecessor, “art”) would encompass a process for 
doing business, the patent community long acted on the basis 
of a widely shared “understanding . . . about what patents were 
meant to protect” under which an application for a patent on a 
business method “would have been seen as absurd.”30 Based on 
this understanding, courts long denied patents for business 
methods, and treatise writers agreed that business methods, as 
generally understood, were outside the patent system.31 
Thus, for well over a century, the courts, including the 
Supreme Court, imbued the text of the patent statute with 
meaning based on widely shared, background understandings 
of how the patent system is supposed to work.32 Courts deployed 
a substantial amount of policy reasoning in arriving at their 
decisions. They accepted an important role in the development 
of patent law. Some of the resulting decisions heavily glossed 
the statutory text, and some can only be described as having 
departed from the statutory text.  
  
 28 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 29 Id. at 67-72.  
 30 Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 577, 585 (1999); see also Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the 
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and 
the Missed Opportunity to Ground Patent Law Interpretation and Return Patent Law to 
Its Technology Mooring, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at *5-9) 
(available on SSRN); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. 
L. REV. 1139, 1145-47 (1999). (Professor Menell’s article, which concerns a topic similar 
to that of this essay, was posted on SSRN in December 2010, after this essay was 
presented at the Brooklyn Law School symposium in November 2010.) 
 31 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3246 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 32 Menell, supra note 30, at *20-21. 
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B. Business Method Patents and Naïve Textualism 
Notwithstanding the long tradition of rich judicial 
involvement in patent law, the Supreme Court recently applied 
quite different interpretive methods with respect to the patent 
statute, and particularly with regard to the question of 
whether business methods are patentable subject matter. The 
issue became prominent after 1998, when the Federal Circuit, 
departing from tradition, declared that there was no “business 
method” exception to patentability.33 The Federal Circuit’s 
ruling led to a decade of uncertainty, during which inventors 
claimed, somewhat absurdly, to have invented everything from 
arbitration34 to hedging.35 
Bilski v. Kappos arose when an inventor sought a patent 
on a method of hedging against certain business risks.36 When 
the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court, speaking 
through Justice Kennedy, produced an opinion notably different 
from those described in the previous section. Gone were the 
appeals to policy and background understandings of the patent 
system. In their place was brisk, textualist reasoning. 
Patent law, the Court declared, is subject to the usual rule 
that, “[u]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”37 In place 
of policy analysis, the Court deployed “dictionary definitions” and 
“common usage.”38 The Court recognized that the long-standing 
exception for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas”39 deviates from the dictionary definitions of words in the 
Patent Act. But the Court denied that “the existence of these well-
established exceptions gives the Judiciary carte blanche to impose 
other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the 
statute’s purpose and design.”40 
With specific regard to the question of whether the term 
“process” can encompass business methods, the Court’s 
  
 33 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 34 In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 35 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223. 
 36 See id. at 3223-24. 
 37 Id. at 3226 (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 182 (1981) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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analysis was starkly textual.41 Looking to a 1954 dictionary, the 
Court quoted the definition of “method” (part of the statutory 
definition of “process”), and observed that this definition—“[a]n 
orderly procedure or process . . . regular way or manner of 
doing anything”42—encompasses methods of doing business. 
The Court set aside the tradition of reading the language of the 
Patent Act in light of history and background understandings; 
it simply relied on the dictionary. 
The Court buttressed its dictionary analysis with just 
one other observation—an appeal to the canonical “rule against 
redundancy.” The Court observed that section 273 of the Patent 
Act provides a special, limited defense to claims based on 
business method patents.43 Such a defense, the Court observed, 
would be superfluous if there were no such thing as business 
method patents in the first place.44 Although the Court 
acknowledged that section 273 was a later addition to the 
Patent Act (it was enacted only after the Federal Circuit’s 1998 
decision approving business method patents),45 it said that the 
rule against redundancy “cannot be overcome by judicial 
speculation as to the subjective intent of various legislators in 
enacting the subsequent provision.”46 
And that was that. Justice Kennedy’s opinion went on to 
invoke some policy reasoning; he explained that tests for 
patentable subject matter had to respect the needs of the 
information age.47 But these policy observations were not part 
of the opinion of the Court. They were segregated into sections 
of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that received four votes only; 
Justice Scalia declined to join them.48 Thus, the opinion of the 
Supreme Court was a textualist opinion that relied exclusively 
on a dictionary definition and a canon of construction to decide 
an extremely important question of patent law. 
  
 41 Menell, supra note 30, at *11-12 (noting that the Court “collapsed the rich 
historical development of patentable subject matter doctrine into three amorphous, 
static, and ill-defined exceptions”). 
 42 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1548 (2d ed. 1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006). 
 44 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29. 
 45 Id.; see also id. at 3250 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 46 Id. at 3229 (opinion of the Court). 
 47 Id. at 3227. 
 48 See id. at 3223 n.*. 
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II. THE DANGERS OF NAÏVE TEXTUALISM 
Bilski illustrates the dangers of naïve textualism. To 
answer the question posed by this symposium, Bilski permits 
statutory language to do too much work. The interpretive regime 
of Bilski can be criticized in at least three ways. First, it seems 
unfair to apply naïve textualism to a statute passed in a former 
era, when courts applied quite different interpretive methods. 
Second, even at its best, naïve textualism will result in too many 
issues being decided by fortuitous language choices by a 
legislature that did not foresee the decisions it was making. And 
finally, at its worst, naïve textualism will serve as a disingenuous 
cover for judicial choices made on extratextual grounds. 
A. The Bait and Switch of Bilski’s Naïve Textualism 
In Bilski, the Supreme Court applied modern-day 
textualism to a statute from a former era. Congress has not 
comprehensively revised the Patent Act since 1952.49 At the 
time Congress was writing the 1952 revisions, it had every 
reason to expect that its handiwork would not be interpreted 
purely textually.50 The courts had spent more than a century 
sensitively applying (and interstitially making) patent law and 
imbuing the statutory text with the spirit of widely shared 
background understandings of the patent system.  
Congress would likely have expected courts to continue 
these practices. The statute’s authors would have expected that 
they could trust the courts to exercise sound discretion in 
implementing the patent system. It seems unfair for courts to 
surprise Congress by changing the interpretive rules after a 
statute is enacted. If an analysis of Bilski’s naïve textualism 
suggests nothing else, it at least suggests that courts should 
interpret a statute using the interpretive techniques that were 
prevalent when the statute was adopted, lest Congress be 
unfairly surprised. 
It is, after all, standard dogma that courts should 
consider a statute’s enactment date in determining the 
meaning of individual words in it: courts look to the words’ 
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”51 That is why the 
  
 49 Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)). 
 50 See supra Part I.A. 
 51 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court consulted a 1954 dictionary to determine the 
meaning of terms in the 1952 statute. But meaning does not 
reside solely in the definitions given to individual words. It is 
also a product of context and interpretive approach. If it is 
sound practice not to read modern definitions of individual 
words into a statute passed in a previous era, then it should be 
sound not to read modern interpretive techniques into the 
statute either. 
Of course, it will not always be easy to say what the 
interpretive regime was at a given point in history. The courts 
make many pronouncements on interpretive methodology and 
are not particularly consistent about it.52 But it seems clear 
that interpretive methods prevailing in 1952 were not nearly as 
textualist as the methods applied by the Supreme Court in 
Bilski. Congress could reasonably claim unfair surprise at the 
Court’s reading modern-day textualism back into history. 
B. Language Doing Too Much Work 
Even setting aside the problem of applying a modern 
interpretive approach to a statute passed in a different era, the 
difficulty with naïve textualism is that it makes language do too 
much work. The result is that fortuitous language choices—what 
Larry Solan calls “linguistic accidents”53—made without 
foreknowledge of issues that would later arise, end up controlling 
questions of great moment. Extraordinary weight is being placed 
on Congress’s choice of the words “process” and “method.” 
The scope of patentable subject matter is vital to the 
patent system. It is difficult to come up with a precise 
definition of patentable subject matter, in part because the 
very purpose of the patent system is to encourage the 
development of new and unforeseen things.54 It is almost 
inevitable, therefore, that the statutory language that defines 
the scope of patentable subject matter will never perfectly 
capture the universe of inventions that should be patentable. 
The patent laws require sensitive construction by judges who 
are knowledgeable in the full context of the patent system. If, 
  
 52 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in 
Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385-89 (2005). 
 53 Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Interpretation, Morality, and the Text, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 1033 (2011). 
 54 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980). 
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instead, the courts “make a fortress out of the dictionary,”55 
they will doom legislatures to producing statutes with 
unintended consequences that depart from widely shared 
understandings of how the system is supposed to work.  
To give the textualists their due, they are surely aware 
of this point, and they have an answer to it. A textualist would 
say that if a statute’s language is not used to answer whatever 
questions arise under it, even questions that were 
unanticipated at the time the language was written, the 
alternative is for judges to answer the questions, and that 
alternative gives judges too much power. Judges are not 
supposed to make policy decisions in a democratic society; they 
are supposed to implement the policy decisions laid down by 
the legislature. By abandoning efforts to imbue statutes with 
the spirit of policies and background understandings, courts 
confine themselves to their proper role. If that means that 
some questions get unanticipated answers, that is the price we 
pay for preventing judges from exercising too much power. 
The riposte to this argument, however, is that glossing 
or even departing from statutory text need not mean that the 
judges are implementing their own policies. In appropriate 
cases glossing or departing from statutory text is precisely 
what is needed to implement the legislature’s policies. The 
trick, of course, is for judges to discern those unusual occasions 
that warrant something other than straightforward application 
of statutory text. Background principles play a critical role in 
this process. When the result of simply running statutory 
language through the dictionary is a startling departure from 
widely shared background understandings of how the system is 
supposed to work, it may be a clue to the court that indicates 
that something other than a purely textual construction of the 
statute is appropriate.56 Judges should certainly not depart 
from statutory language at will, but neither should they make 
statutory language do all the work. 
C. Language as a Cover for Judicial Decision Making 
Moreover, the argument that judges ought to answer 
questions based solely on statutory language, lest they exercise 
too much policy-making power, is based on a highly 
  
 55 See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.). 
 56 Siegel, supra note 52, at 373-74. 
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questionable assumption—namely, that courts really can set 
aside all other influences and decide questions based solely on 
the statutory text. In fact, this seems unlikely. There is too 
much indeterminacy in statutory text. Even courts that 
purport to be abdicating any policy-making role and following 
the rule laid down in the text may be making an interpretive 
choice—as can be seen in Bilski. 
In Bilski, the Court relied on a standard canon of 
statutory construction, the rule against redundancy.57 The 
Court noted (rightly enough) that the recently added section 
273 of the Patent Act, which provides a limited defense to suits 
based on business method patents, would be redundant if 
business method patents could never exist. From a textualist 
perspective, this is a strong argument. 
The flaw in the argument, however, is that courts must 
make a choice regarding whether to follow the rule against 
redundancy. Sometimes courts set aside the rule on the ground 
that a legislature occasionally writes redundant statutory text 
as a precaution. Indeed, just two years before Bilski, in Ali v. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons,58 the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Federal Tort Claims Act in a way that arguably rendered some 
words in the statutory text superfluous.59 The Court justified its 
ruling by asserting that Congress might have inserted the 
superfluous language “to remove any doubt.”60 Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito, all part of the 
Bilski majority, joined this opinion.61 
Two years later, in Bilski, the Court flatly asserted that 
the rule against redundancy “cannot be overcome by judicial 
speculation as to the subjective intent of legislators.”62 
Obviously, this assertion is at best overstated and at worst 
  
 57 See supra Part I.B. 
 58 552 U.S. 214 (2008). 
 59 See id. at 237 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court’s 
reading rendered part of the text “mere surplusage” in violation of the rule against 
redundancy). 
 60 Id. at 226 (majority opinion). 
 61 The Court similarly rejected application of the rule against redundancy on 
the ground that the legislature might have inserted apparently superfluous language 
to avoid risk of doubt in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 260 (1994), 
although in that case the more textualist justices joined a separate concurrence. See 
also Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (holding that a court 
may reject words as “surplusage” if they are “inadvertently inserted or . . . repugnant 
to the rest of the statute”) (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
525 (1980)). 
 62 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). 
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disingenuous. The Court has overcome the rule against 
redundancy through judicial speculation about the subjective 
intent of legislators. Indeed, the speculation in Ali was more 
aggressive than would have been the necessary speculation in 
Bilski. In Ali there was no particular evidence to suggest that 
Congress had acted out of the caution that the Court attributed 
to it, whereas in Bilski there was powerful evidence of the 
motives behind the potentially redundant provision. Congress 
inserted the statutory defense to actions based on business 
method patents only after the Federal Circuit ruled that such 
patents could be lawful. It seems quite plausible that Congress 
was not trying to ratify the Federal Circuit’s decision, but to 
limit any fallout that would ensue if that decision were 
ultimately to stand.63 
Something other than statutory language, therefore, 
told the Supreme Court that it could overcome the rule against 
redundancy in Ali, but not in Bilski.64 The judges made a 
choice. Even within textualism, the rules of statutory 
interpretation are not perfectly constraining. The canons of 
construction are only guides.65 It is wrong to pretend that the 
courts cannot overcome canons of statutory interpretation 
when they can and do. 
Justice Scalia has accused those who rely on legislative 
history of using it merely as “an omnipresent makeweight for 
decisions arrived at on other grounds.”66 Naïve textualism uses 
text in the same way. It is bad enough to make language do all 
the work. It is even worse to pretend that language has done 
all the work, when other factors must have guided a court’s 
understanding of that language. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court did not reach an inappropriate 
result in Bilski—all nine justices agreed that the claimed 
  
 63 Of course, rather than insert a limited defense to business method patents, 
Congress could have clarified that such patents should never be granted. But it might 
have lacked the votes to settle the ultimate question of the validity of business method 
patents, while having the votes for the limited defense. 
 64 See also Menell, supra note 30, at *14-15 (noting that the Court’s choice to 
apply the canonical rule against redundancy in Bilski was in tension with the equally 
canonical principle that repeals by implication are not favored). 
 65 E.g., Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94. 
 66 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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invention was not patentable. But the Court displayed an 
unfortunately naïve interpretive attitude. Setting aside the 
centuries-old tradition of imbuing the text of the patent 
statutes with a rich awareness of the history, policy, and 
background understandings of the patent system, the Court 
imagined, or at least pretended to imagine, that it could 
interpret the Patent Act with no more tools than the dictionary 
and the canons of construction.  
Such naïve textualism, if generally applied, would make 
the legislature’s job, and ultimately the task of governing, even 
harder than it already is. The legislature cannot foresee 
everything as it writes statutes. Judges must exercise 
judgment in the process of statutory interpretation. Language 
cannot do all the work. 
